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Genocide’s Aftermath: Neostalinism in Contemporary Crimea
Greta Uehling

University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI, USA

Abstract: The Crimean Tatars’ genocide is one of the clearest, and yet least studied of twentieth-century genocides.
This article explores that genocide’s aftermath, beginning with the Crimean Tatars’ attempts to reinscribe their
presence in their historic homeland following the 1944 deportation. The ongoing contestations over the past are
examined here as a historical habitus informing attitudes and behavior in the present. Drawing on unparalleled
interview data with the Russian-speaking population in Crimea, I explore the durability and ontological resonance
of constructions of Tatars as traitors both past and present. Ethnographic insight into the local understandings
that feed exclusion, discrimination, and hatred enhance our understanding of genocide as a social process. Given
the lack of either guilt or shame regarding the 1944 deportation, I suggest that Crimea currently lacks the cognitive
and affective foundation to create a more inclusive future.
Keywords: Genocide, Stalin, Crimea, Crimean Tatars, ethnic cleansing, commemoration, deportation, ontological
resonance
The Crimean Tatars’ genocide is one of the clearest, and yet least studied twentieth-century
genocides. The definition used here is an inclusive one, best summarized by Alexander Hinton as
“the more or less coordinated attempt to destroy a dehumanized and excluded group of people
because of who they are.”1 The death toll as a result of the 1944 deportation was catastrophic: 46
percent of the population is believed to have perished at that time.2 In addition to this physical
destruction, efforts were made to cleanse all traces of them from the Crimean landscape, and to
ensure the assimilation of survivors in places of exile. Analyzing these and subsequent events
within the framework of critical genocide studies reveals the treatment of the indigenous Crimean
Tatars as an ongoing social practice and technology of power on the part of first the Russian and
then the Soviet regimes.3
The systematic erasure of the Crimean Tatars was holistic in nature. Crimean Tatar place
names were changed to Soviet ones; mosques were turned into movie theatres (or worse); homes,
livestock and gardens were given away; and mention of Crimean Tatars was deleted or abbreviated
in reference works. Crimean Tatars were not allowed to reside in, or speak of, their homeland.
It wasn’t even possible to preserve a Crimean Tatar identity in personal documents. In Central
Asia, before efforts to assimilate the survivors were underway, Crimean Tatars lived in a Special
Settlement regime in which tens of thousands died of malnutrition, dehydration, and disease. They
were also demonized. To give but one example, Crimean Tatars describe how children’s heads
were checked for horns by their Central Asian school teachers.
This article unfolds in several steps. Considering that one component or aftermath of genocide
is the attempt to erase the group from official history, I explore sites of memory, especially
public commemoration. Although the ability of Crimean Tatars to commemorate their past as
part of independent Ukraine at first suggests resilience, their efforts to reinscribe their presence
on the peninsula and regain their rights have been met with opposition and resistance. Public
commemorations interest me because they are one way in which competing interpretations
of history become audible or legible and are then contested. Two insurrections of subjugated
knowledge as part of independent Ukraine, billboards and a film, demonstrate these contestations.
That the Crimean population, for the most part, does not recognize the treatment of the Crimean
Tatars as genocide at all calls for deeper analysis. In the next part of the paper, I explore the
thoughts and emotions behind the antipathy that continues to be directed at this indigenous
people. Ethnographic insight into the local understandings that feed exclusion, discrimination,
and hatred will enhance our understanding of genocide as a social process. My approach extends
the work of other scholars of genocide by suggesting there is a historical habitus, or ingrained
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way of interpreting and embodying the past. These interpretations are fortified by what Hinton
has called the ontological resonance of genocide. In Crimea, this ontological resonance manifests
in categorical distinctions of Crimean Tatars as dangerous Others. Finally, I show how the postannexation treatment of the Crimean Tatars by local and Russian Federation authorities shows an
effort to restructure relations among the living yet again, in part by circumscribing interpretations
of the past. Taken together, this exploration leads me ask whether we are witnessing what scholars
of genocide would call an extended aftermath, or priming for a new round.
Methods
This article is based on long-term fieldwork conducted in Crimea in 1995, 1997-98, 2001, 2004,
and 2011, when I lived and worked among the indigenous Crimean Tatar population. During the
1997-98 fieldwork, I lived in both Central Asia, where the majority of Crimean Tatars remaining in
diaspora and their descendants reside, and in Crimea. The ethnography published in 2004 did not
delve deeply into the views of Russians in Crimea. This article begins to fill that gap. I returned in
2013 and, struck by signs of neo-Stalinism, collected the data presented here.
The ethnographic fieldwork carried out in May and June 2013 sought to better understand
how and why Tatarophobia, or xenophobia had become so prevalent on the peninsula. During the
fieldwork, I gathered several kinds of data, interpolated here. First, unstructured interviews with
political and cultural leaders, school teachers and principals, newspaper editors, journalists, and
civil society monitors enabled me to begin tracking the ground level processes through which
shared interpretations were being formed. Second, taped, semi-structured interviews conducted
with a stratified sample of sympathizers with the Russian Federation4 (ethnic Russians and mixed
Russian and Ukrainians) using visual images of Stalin to elicit responses provided another layer
of information. These data are not intended to be representative: my objective is rather to reveal
some of the deeper layers informing the abysmal treatment of the Tatars that are obscured in
other accounts. I used visual prompts because as Plamper has shown, reverence for Stalin was
“overwhelmingly a visual phenomenon, tailored to a population whose mental universe was
shaped primarily by images as opposed to written words.”5 The deep psychological and spiritual
importance of images of the so-called father of peoples is clear considering that Stalin portraits
were often hung in the corner of the home that had previously been reserved for icons.
In 2013, I also drew on a third source of information: participation in a number of commemorative
activities related to the Day of Mourning. The interviews and participant observation in Crimea
upon which the core of my argument is built are supplemented by ongoing communication with
consultants in the region, as well as close attention to Crimean Tatars’ news reporting available on
the Internet today.
Aftermaths: Independent Ukraine
Any country emerging from a totalitarian, genocidal, or war-torn past must confront questions
about how to frame and incorporate that past while designing a better future. As Nanci Adler has
argued, “The process of fashioning a good future out of a ‘bad past’ is tricky and may require the
creation of a ‘usable past’ for the national narrative.”6 The field of reconciliation studies suggests
there are multiple layers and approaches here, including acknowledgement, apology, truth, justice,
and reparations.7 And yet, post-Soviet Russia only made limited efforts to confront its Stalinist past,
seeming to prefer to suppress memories of repression.8 As a result, surviving victims of Stalinism
have been insufficiently acknowledged. Adler sees the prevalence of the state-sponsored narrative
over the victims’ counter-histories as part of a larger failure to create adequate transitional justice
mechanisms and move toward full-fledged civil society. From her perspective, Russia has not yet
created a space for what she calls “engaging dialogues,” that could lead to inclusive history.9
Within a framework of critical genocide studies, we can go farther. Not only has their been
insufficient acknowledgement, but the Crimean Tatar genocide is treated first by Soviet and now
Russian Federation authorities as something the Crimean Tatars brought upon themselves. Locals
allege the Crimean Tatars’ punishment was justified, even though there is no morally or ethically
sound justification for the treatment they received. In part, this is a result of diametrically opposed
interpretations of history. Russians and those of mixed Russian and Ukrainian heritage who are
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pro-Russia tend to deploy an idiom that legitimatizes their presence by referencing the fact that
Crimea was a part of Russia from 1783 until 1954, and reiterate the charges of treason during the
Nazi occupation of Crimea. The Crimean Tatars counter this by pointing to what the charges elide,
which is that members of all ethnic groups contributed to the Nazi occupation, and that these are
not the people who were punished by the 1944 deportation, which carried away innocents. That
Crimean Tatars soldiers fought (and gave their lives) on the Soviet front and were demobilized
into exile is of course a moral outrage. They also emphasize their autochthonous origins on the
peninsula, long before Ekaterina II annexed the peninsula. Thus it is important to recognize the
extent to which different ethnic groups—and here I will focus on the pro-Russian contingent
and Crimean Tatars—have competing idioms for relating to, and when necessary justifying their
presence on, the peninsula they share.10 While their idioms overlap on concern with the meaning
of homeland, patriotism, and treason, they have very different reference points.
It is worthwhile to contrast the situation in the Russian Federation with post-genocidal settings
where transitional justice mechanisms, however imperfect or limited, have been established. For
example, Molly Andrews has argued the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
created a national narrative and ultimately a common framework for the whole country to
understand the past.11 She suggests that (again, in spite of many shortcomings) the South-African
commission managed to forge a dialogue between official and personal narratives, and to formulate
an inclusive history. A rich line of research into the reconciliation process explores the nuances of
this process in a variety of countries.12
As a part of Ukraine, Crimea occupied a volatile and yet fertile position between these two
variants. An insurrection of previously subjugated knowledges led, while the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea was part of Ukraine, to writing the 1944 deportation back into history books, putting
the minarets back on the mosques, and erecting multiple public monuments to commemorate
Crimean Tatar military heroes and cultural leaders. While the process was far from complete, and
characterized by failures and frustrations, it is important to recognize the extent to which Crimean
Tatars were able to reinstate their rightful presence on the peninsula, and reinscribe their history
on the landscape they hold sacred.
Even as they became legible on the Crimean peninsula, however, it became a landscape of
hatred and distrust as monuments and memorials were marked with swastikas or other xenophobic
graffiti, and groups clashed over such matters as placing a market on a Crimean Tatar sacred site.
As part of Ukraine, hostility against Crimean Tatars included attacks and pogroms against Crimean
Tatar settlements and property in 2004. An attack on a Crimean Tatar settlement backed by special
Ukrainian Berkut riot police in January and November, 2007; the attack and beating of Crimean
Tatars on the Ay-Petri plateau in November 2007; and vandalism of Crimean Tatar cemeteries
and memorials in Zaprudne, Zuya. Saq, Bagcasaray, Nyznohirskyi and many other locales. The
Foundation for Research and Support of Indigenous Peoples that tracks these activities concluded
vandalism is more the rule than the exception.13
How to understand these contestations? Within the framework of critical genocide studies, a
Foucauldian genealogy with its concepts of counter-memory and counter-history helps to decipher
the struggle over commemoration and competing visions of the past.14 This approach is relevant
because as part of Ukraine, cross currents of power and resistance appeared to be reshaping the
field of commemoration and expanding the space for remembering different, sometimes painful
aspects of the past. By way of background, counter-histories try to undo the silences imposed
by official histories, and to undermine the unity and continuity that dominant histories produce.
The ability to identify omissions and to fill discursive gaps previously imposed by authorities is
an important component of exercising agency and resisting both hegemonic power/knowledge
frameworks and, at a more concrete level, sociopolitical subjugation.
My 2004 ethnography detailed how activists in the Crimean Tatar national movement such as
Mustafa Cemilev, Reshat Cemilev, Aishe Seitmuratov, Rustem Khalilov, Izzet Khairov and many
others, clearly articulated a counter-narrative explicating how the 1944 deportation violated the laws
and principles of the Soviet regime, and subjected the Crimean Tatar people to decimation. They also
make clear that by the time of the deportation, the Crimean Tatar people had survived not just the
initial colonization, but confiscation of their property, state-induced famine, purges of clergy and

©2015

Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 1 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.1.1273

Uehling

6

intellectuals, and Nazi occupation.15 In a personal interview, this was aptly summarized by Mustafa
Cemilev as being caught between to hegemons, neither of whom promised any protection or relief.16
What I am concerned with presently is less the historical scholarship and activism facilitating
the Crimean Tatars mass return in the 1990s, than the public spaces where ordinary Crimean Tatars,
Ukrainians and Russians are now interlocutors. These sites demonstrate that there is no single
aftermath of genocide: it becomes a plural noun. Pro-Russian and pro-Crimean Tatar versions of
the past are diametrically opposed. The differing perspectives on the past led, unquestionably, to
different perspectives on the future. We now see each group has very different access to rights and
resources on the peninsula as a legacy of the deportation.
The Contested Past
In spite of attempts to erase and assimilate them, the Crimean Tatars survived their exile, launched
a powerful national movement, and mobilized sufficient personal and political resources to
repatriate.17 Since they began returning, Crimean Tatars have struggled to reverse the effects of the
literal and discursive cleansing.18 Examples show the slow movement of a previously marginalized
Crimean Tatar past into the Crimean imagined community.
One example is the commemoration of the 1944 deportation, referred to in Crimea as a “день
память и скорби” or day of memory and mourning. In a move that would certainly have been
quashed 20 years ago, some twelve billboards calling participants to observe the occasion were
positioned across Crimea. One billboard calling for observance of the day showed an image of
several intersecting lines of barbed wire and a message about the 69th commemoration, bringing
knowledge that was previously disqualified and excluded into the public space. Another billboard
brings home the point even more clearly.

Figure 1. Billboard of Iminov painting calling for commemoration. Source: Author’s photograph.

Rustem Iminov’s painting of a crowded train car, once concealed in his private studio on a
quiet street in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, was suddenly enlarged many times and thrust into the visual
field of all drivers in Crimea, whether Russian, Ukrainian, or Crimean Tatar. The billboard makes
visible how women, children, and the elderly were carried away in cattle cars, not to mention the
soldiers’ unfortunate demobilization. Thanks to the artist’s willingness for others to use this image,
it has become iconic of the Crimean Tatars’ deportation. I turn to the billboards because they are
one way that the Crimean Tatars can speak to other residents of Crimea with whom they might not
otherwise exchange views.19
I first met Iminov and saw the painting in 1998, when he was living in Central Asia. I learned
that whereas Iminov’s father, also a painter, was forced to communicate his ideas cryptically in
symbolic codes, Iminov succeeded in putting his mother’s individual memories of deportation in
public, pictorial form.20 The trajectory of this painting from a private Tashkent studio to a Simferopol
billboard indexes the Crimean Tatars’ own journey from silenced and exiled, to repatriated citizens
of independent Ukraine. The billboards constitute an intervention into the hegemonic conception
of the past that failed to register the Crimean Tatars during their absence.
A second example of the insurrection of previously subjugated knowledge, and one that
generated a great deal more epistemic friction21 is provided by the 2013 release of a feature film
about the 1944 deportation, Haytarma.
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Figure 2. Promotional flyer for the film Haytarma. Source: The image is taken from the jacket of the CD, and was the
flyer for the showing of the film as well.

The film is structured around the life of the half Crimean Tatar fighter pilot, Amet-Han Sultan.
The film follows the protagonist through his service when he was stationed in Crimea. The major
turn in the plot comes when Amet-Han Sultan is given leave to see his family on the eve of the
deportation. He and two friends find themselves in Amet-Han’s native village on the night of the
mass deportation. We then experience a filmic representation of that terrible night.
The film has been criticized on the grounds that it uses the language and iconography of the
colonizers to communicate its message.22 Admittedly, we see a colonized people taking on, and
quite literally acting in, the uniform of the oppressor. While this reading of the film is valid on
formal grounds, a more nuanced reading is possible if we listen to the conversations about the film
among Crimean Tatars. Recalling that Crimean Tatars were banned from speaking of Crimea in
exile, and that no images of the actual deportation are known to exist, the film elevated previously
silenced and submerged memories of war and deportation. While perhaps not a counter-history in
the sense of a full-fledged denunciation of the Soviet regime, the film does critique the Soviet’s 1944
deportation. By portraying Amet-Han’s bravery and patriotism fighting on the Soviet side, the film
also attempts to deconstruct the racist categorization of Crimean Tatars as solely collaborators with
the German occupiers, and shows ethnically-integrated villages. Like the billboards, the film fills
a visual lacuna.
For younger Crimean Tatars, parents’ and grandparents’ stories were finally in a visual format.
Crimean Tatars who acted in the film describe participation as an intense, even cathartic experience.
At the premier I attended, the film was followed by stunned silence and muffled sobbing. The film
also received many standing ovations by audiences in Crimea and Kyiv. It is fair to say the film
punctured the silenced history of deportation and brought Crimean Tatar patriotism into public
view. If respondents in my fieldwork were correct in their assessment, a page that had been left
blank, and that had long complicated the mourning process, was now filled, helping to resolve
some emotions about the event.
The film’s release generated a great deal of epistemic friction concerning how to most
accurately portray the Crimean past. The controversy began when the Consul General for the
Russian Federation in Crimea, Vladimir Andreev, admonished the Russian generals trained by
Amet-Han Sultan not to attend the Premier. Six of the eight surviving generals took his advice.23
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Mr. Andreev clarified his position publically on Crimean television. Resurrecting a trope from
the Second World War (referred to as Great Patriotic War in Crimea), Andreev stated that Russia
should not be represented at the premier of a film that falsifies the truth of this war. His primary
argument was that the film did not grapple with the ostensibly salient theme of collaboration on
the part of Crimean Tatars with the fascist occupiers. Public discourses like these are a primary way
that ideologies and cultural stances are not just created, but maintained. Andreev’s remark seems
designed to create cultural continuity at a moment when it was threatened by change in postSoviet Ukraine. By resurrecting the old categorizations of Crimean Tatars as somehow disloyal to
the homeland, Andreev re-polarized the field of commemoration in a move seemingly intended to
inscribe the Soviet-era social hierarchy.
Based on the reaction in the family I was living with at the time, Andreev’s comments left the
Crimean Tatars feeling angry and emotionally bruised. One of my hosts stood and paced, another
turned red in the face, and all three raised their voices to talk back to the TV. Andreev’s remarks
also set off a series of demonstrations that were publicized on the nightly news. Holding Andreev’s
portrait flanked by pictures of Beria and Stalin, Crimean Tatars countered the slur by pointing out
the symbolic isomorphism between the present Consul General and past Soviet leaders. There
were also a series of verbal duels that ricocheted through social media like Facebook.
While the Crimean Tatar contribution in the Second World War remains hotly contested in
Crimea, Andreev’s intolerance was not accepted, even by authorities. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry
immediately requested Russian Federation authorities to evaluate the statements. In an address
before the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, then Vice President of the
Crimean Tatar Mejlis Refat Chubarov demanded the Russian Federation deplore the intolerant
statement. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation did indeed acknowledge the
statement was inappropriate, and Andreev resigned. As we can see from the conflict over Andreev’s
remarks, references to collaboration with the Nazi forces are particularly toxic in Crimea where,
even though all the ethnic groups collaborated, Crimean Tatars have been consistently singled out
as responsible. Ukraine rose, however feebly, in the Crimean Tatar defense.
While a great deal of the contemporary friction is generated by the issue of Second World
War collaboration, the roots of mistrust lie deeper in the colonial past. The Russian Empire saw
Crimean Tatars as uncivilized, inferior to Russians, and potentially disloyal. This references events
during the Crimean War. Raids on Muscovy in the Middle Ages are also often cited today.24 In light
of these analyses, Tatarophobia has less to do with the Second World War than the Crimean Tatars’
long term positioning on the peninsula. Views of the peninsula’s past have remained in separate,
diametrically opposed, silos. While ethnic Russians see themselves as the original inhabitants of
Crimea, and argue the Crimean khanate had a weak economy and was only a vassal of the Ottoman
Empire, Crimean Tatars assert that the Crimean khanate was a highly civilized state in which
all faiths were accepted, ethnic groups flourished, and the economy thrived. Both are of course
simplified interpretations. What is more destructive is the view (whether embraced by ethnically
Russian or ethnically mixed individuals) that Russian culture is superior, supranational, and
provides a consolidating function. There is also an essentialism that Crimean Tatars are inherently
hostile and cruel, another justification for their removal from Crimea. From a broader perspective,
then, the Crimean Tatars were prefigured for predatel’stvo or treason.
Neostalinism
To reestablish the Crimean Tatar presence on the peninsula would require restructuring the worlds
of meaning in which Crimean Tatars are cast as traitors or villains. Efforts during the Ukrainian
period marking the anniversary of the 1944 deportation, erecting monuments to the Crimean
Tatar past, and writing the 1944 deportation back into history, re-politicized space and time.25 As
if obeying Newton’s Third Law, for every Crimean Tatar action there was an equal and opposite
reaction. A paradigmatic example is the counter-movement revalorizing Stalin in Crimea. In 2012,
an organization named Essence of Time held an exhibition commemorating the 133rd anniversary of
Stalin’s birth. They combined about 150 images with laudatory comments about Stalin. These were
presented on large placards in the center of the capitol city where descendants of the victims of
genocide would be sure to look on. The Crimean Tatar executive body, the Mejlis, spoke out during
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the planning stage, pointing out such an exhibit would be profoundly disrespectful to victims of
Stalin. The exhibit took place nonetheless.

Figure 3. Stalin lauded in capitol of Crimea, 2013. Source: Информационное агентство «е-Крым» http://www.ecrimea.info

On the opening day, the Head of the International Relations department of the Mejlis went
to the exhibit with the head of the Secretariat of the Crimean Parliament.26 They called on the
organizers to take down the images, pointing out that Stalin was found guilty of the death of
millions of people, and had personally ordered the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, a criminal
act. When the organizers refused to remove the exhibit, the offended visitors dismantled the stands
themselves.
Several dozen law enforcement officers present at the rally did not intervene. The authorities’
non-response, effectively allowing residents of Crimea to battle for commemorative space
themselves, reveals official ambivalence, or perhaps uncertainty about how to effectively moderate
competing claims. As one respondent put it, “the Mayor who allowed it knew it was against the
law, but in the depths of their souls, they don’t want to see us here, they hate us. They know they
have taken other peoples’ places.”27 The exhibit took place in a time and place when Stalin enjoyed
fabulous public ratings. Levada Center polls showed that among other things, people credited
victory in the Second World War to Stalin himself, and felt that the importance of the victory far
outweighed any mistakes that were made.28 Another survey suggested that respondents saw Stalin
as one of the “most eminent figures of all time.”29
How could Stalin enjoy such a long political life? Considering there was not one but two
intensive efforts de-Stalinize the Soviet Union and facilitate political liberalization, this at first
seems remarkable. The first attempt was after the 20th Party speech by Nikita Krushchev, which
broke a silence about Stalin’s repressive regime and called for the removal of Stalin from public
spaces. The second effort was part of President Gorbachev’s reforms. Gorbachev recognized the
need for the Soviet government to give consistent financial and moral support to people who could
speak openly. Gorbachev’s de-Stalinization in the 1980s faced many of the same problems that
Krushchev’s had in the 1960s.30 Polly Jones suggests the enduring criticisms are that de-Stalinization
is a form of “de-heroization,” “falsification,” and “ideological deviation.”31 The psychology that
keeps Stalin alive aligns with the work of Freud, Derrida, and Gilroy on melancholia, helping us to
understand neostalinism as an inability to distinguish between past and present.32 Freud’s famous
delineation of melancholia from mourning is useful here.
Why wasn’t the Soviet government more successful in de-Stalinizing the country? Jones
suggests that what is blocking genuine de-Stalinization is what she calls the “mutual interference”
of memories of terror and memories of war victory.33 This is to say that there is a central, seemingly
irresolvable tension at the core of public memory: how to celebrate the Soviet victory and confront
its failures, so as to recognize the victims too? In Russia, organizations like Memorial have tried to
grapple with this issue, and their work has resonated with tens of thousands of people. This is an
especially fraught issue in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, where the problem is ethnicallycharged.
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Ontological Resonance
The outward struggle over this field of commemoration is energized by what Pierre Bourdieu
would call a habitus or durable disposition. Habitus is Bourdieu’s notion of a “system of lasting,
transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a
matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions.”34 Habitus is eminently historical: “The habitus, a
product of history, produces individual and collective practices—more history—in accordance with
the schemes generated by history.”35 We can understand this as something that is simultaneously
micro and macro-sociological: a neo- or pro-Stalinist disposition is acquired through a gradual
process of inculcation at the same time that it reflects the social conditions in which it was acquired.
A habitus is never independent of its field, what Bourdieu saw as a set of objective, historical
relations, anchored by power.36 Along similar lines, in Why Did They Kill, Hinton argues that
genocide is complex and involves a certain “ontological resonance” of local cultural knowledge
that, through a variety of factors, rises to the level of having motivational force. Like Hinton, I am
interested in the role of the patterns of being-in-the-world that are constituted over time as people
engage in social practices that ultimately come to inform acts of political violence, whether the
Khmer, Russian, or Soviet.37
To better understand the disposition informing the exhibit to rehabilitate Stalin in Crimea,
and to glean insight into ongoing antipathy towards Crimean Tatars, I interviewed a stratified
sample of respondents from the roster of the Russian Society.38 I used images of Stalin collected in
Corbescero’s research in Russia as prompts to elicit informants’ feelings about the leader.39 The first
image was a famous portrait of Stalin in uniform.

Figure 4. Portrait of Stalin by Aleksandr Laktionov. Source: Corbescero (2011).

The second was the same portrait remade as a vodka label, a third depicted the same Stalin
image writ large on a bus to celebrate the 9th of May,40 and the last image showed demonstrators each
carrying an individual Stalin portrait in a demonstration. The images elicited reactions both verbal
and visceral: respondents laughed and cried when they viewed the images. Their reactions suggest
deep emotional connections to the past and a durable disposition integrating past experiences and
present perceptions.
Neither guilt nor shame
Veneration for Stalin reverberated throughout the interviews with Russians and individuals
with mixed Russian and Ukrainian heritage but embracing a pro-Russian perspective, in Crimea.
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Presented with images of the leader, respondents used expressions like “gratitude that we are
alive,” “pride for the activities he carried out,” “empathy,” “neutral,” “accepting,” and “this is the
image of a good person,” to describe their feelings. Sometimes, the thinking had twisted logic: “If
he was such a tyrant, they would have shot him!” This respondent clearly had not thought through
how tyranny works, or the way in which it is the very tyranny of the tyrant that protects him.
One strategy that seemed to help respondents maintain a positive image of the leader was to
minimize his crimes:
How do you feel when you look at this portrait?
Respondent: How to put it into words? Empathy. Empathy that he may have overplayed his
leadership somewhat. True, he was on the cruel side.41

In a dizzying moral inversion, this respondent chose to empathize with the leader, rather than his
victims. In making the comment, this respondent used the word жестоковата, using a qualifier
to say Stalin was “on the cruel side,” shrinking massive crimes against humanity into a minor
attribute. It is only in the context of this frame of mind that the crude and ultimately inaccurate
binary between Russian patriotism and Tatar collaboration can be maintained. Officially sanctioned
amnesia of Crimean Tatar patriotism, and willed forgetting of the true level of Stalin’s crimes
perpetuate this outlook.
Minimization went hand in hand with justification. Part of the justification appeared based
on survival. Respondents hypothesized that what Stalin did was necessary for victory, and linked
their personal survival to his tactics:
How do you feel when you look at this portrait?
Respondent: Gratitude that we are alive [starting to cry] During the war, we had nothing,
nothing [explanation of things eaten to survive]. Then, after the war, my mother and I had
tea with sugar in it and I will remember that tea for the rest of my life, it made such an
impression after going for so long with so little.42

The survival of extreme deprivation understandably elicits gratitude. But if we juxtapose
the sweetness of the tea with the death toll from Stalin’s regime, the “cost” of that tea, and the
respondent’s apparently complete emotional disconnection from the magnitude of the crimes
committed in the name of her homeland, becomes evident. Due to the secrecy surrounding the
camps, the length of time that has elapsed, and the variety of means to eliminate people, an exact
death toll is difficult to calculate. However, representatives of the Soviet security services gave
the figure of 18 million.43 These facts are lost to residents of Crimea when focused on reliving and
recognizing victory. The neostalinist views expressed by non-Crimean Tatar informants suggest a
durable disposition or habitus cultivated for decades.
Justifications for deporting innocent women, children, elderly, and war-wounded residents of
Crimea were also based on the idea that the Crimean Tatars somehow deserved and, in thinking
that stretches credulity, even benefitted from the deportation. Russian justifications tend to be
dissociated from the reality of genocide. As one example:
If Stalin decided it, then that means it was necessary. And the thing is, they [Crimean Tatars]
slaughtered whole villages under the fascists. He [Stalin] cast them out, but he sent them
to a warmer climate! It was a radical measure that was correct at the time. See how spiteful
[Crimean Tatars] are to complain? They left a place where life was good.44

The place they left is of course Central Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. The sentiments expressed
here are widespread in Crimea, where the non-Crimean Tatar population often alleges that it
was “humanitarian” to deport the Tatars to a warm climate rather than exterminating them. The
acceptance of Stalin’s act emerging in these interviews reveals the affective and cognitive substrate,
the habitus informing events like the commemoration of Stalin in the center of Simferopol in 2012,
and subsequent events.
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Writing about Crimea, Rory Finnin explores the potential of poetry to shift one’s perspective
from focusing on the victor to a more empathic position in relation to victims. He explores how
two poems, one by Chichibabin and one by Nekipelov, create receptivity to perceive the mass
deportation of innocents (collaborators are believed to have been evacuated with the retreating
German army) as one of Stalin’s greatest crimes. Thinking of more tolerant and empathic segments
of the population than I spoke with, Finnin suggests that a deep reading of the poems can engage
a reader in “an act of guilt-processing conducive to committed activism.”45 Finnin thinks literary
works can prompt recognition of the complicity of Soviet citizens in the deportation. The twist is
that the process is more likely to succeed when hearing from some subject positions rather than
others: if the literary work comes from the victimized community, it is liable to evoke shame,
which is apt to prompt to avoidance. Guilt, on the other hand, tends to mobilize efforts to repair
and make amends.
It is unlikely that the affective and cognitive recognition of Stalin’s act as a crime will occur
in a Crimean society overshadowed by accusations of treason. In the 2013 fieldwork, Crimean
Tatars frequently lamented the absence of anything resembling guilt. On the contrary, informants’
statements seemed to re-sacralize46 Stalin’s authority, perhaps as a way to maintain a dominant
position in Crimean society and to reanimate the sense of victory and empowerment that came with
his rule. Articulating her response to the picture of Stalin in uniform, a Russian informant stated:
He was, is, and will always be forever a great leader. It’s like he is sacred and you can’t just
erase that from your heart. Millions of people died with his name on their lips. How can you
throw that away? It’s too late to change anything now [weeping]. I am sorry about the tears
but this is the life I lived.47

The reverence for Stalin surfacing in certain segments of the population suggested ongoing
enchantment with the leader. I asked this respondent if she thought Russian or Ukrainian residents
of Crimea who were not deported or were brought in after the war to take Crimean Tatars’ places
felt a sense of guilt.
Me personally? No! Why would I feel guilty? I understand many Russians and Ukrainians
live in Tatars homes. I myself live in a Tatar’s home! But it was vacant at the time we came.48

What this informant had disassociated from is why the home was vacant when she and her mother
arrived. As actors on a field of public remembering, these respondents used victory to rationalize
the price paid by the Crimean Tatar people.
It is not coincidental that the statements made here were uttered in the Simferopol headquarters
of the Russian Society. Respondents spoke under posters of Sergei Aksyonov who was then head
of the Russia Unity party, and was elected Prime Minister in March 2014. In other words, these
are the sentiments of some of his constituency. What I did not know in 2013 was how accurately
they foreshadowed the poor treatment of Crimean Tatars accompanying the annexation. An
anthropological approach is valuable here because it reveals the ontological resonance of Crimean
Tatars as Other, both past and present. The constructions of Crimean Tatars as traitors demonstrate
the ontological resonance of categories established in the Russian colonial period. It also
foreshadows the treatment of the Crimean Tatars following annexation. The time period following
2014 annexation was marked by a range of human rights abuses: Crimean Tatars were banned from
assembling, and threatened, imprisoned, and exiled when they dared to express dissent. Crimean
Tatars were harassed with searches and seizures in their homes, schools and mosques. Even worse,
there have been arrests, arbitrary detentions, and disappearances.49
Reflecting on this pocket of disavowal and amnesia, I asked Mustafa Cemilev what explains
the lack of empathy for Crimean Tatars. His insights suggest links between the official history and
popular sentiment, and between denial and fear.
Tatarphobia is understandable given the kind of propaganda that people were stuffed with
since the Crimean Tatars were deported. Plus, this propaganda gave them some spiritual
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peace considering they were living in our homes. There is also a fear that maybe what
happened to the Tatars will happen to them.50

The characterization of Crimean Tatars as ‘traitors who sold the motherland’ has proven impervious
to change. It provides an expedient phrase that encapsulates the ontological resonance prefiguring
Crimean Tatars as different, as guilty, and as deserving of punishment.
The challenges associated with acknowledging the genocide are not unique to Crimea: we see
very similar issues arising in other settings. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer provide
important thinking on this topic by suggesting it was a complex defense mechanism against
memory that prevented Germans after the Second World War from experiencing feelings of guilt.51
These scholars saw the disavowal of any complicity, as well as admiration for Adolf Hitler, as the
core of a constellation of psychological symptoms including antisemitism. Psychoanalysts have
developed this line of thinking to explore how guilt and shame, as well as defenses against them,
are passed inter-generationally.52 Katharina Rothe suggests that antisemitism should be considered
a defense against empathizing with the victims in the Second World War.53
This idea presents rich possibilities for understanding dynamics in Crimea, where local
residents’ distrust of Tatars often seems based more on fiction than reality,54 and where, as Refat
Chubarov noted in front of the Crimean Parliament at the time of Consul General Andreev’s acerbic
remarks, xenophobic statements have become almost fashionable in public discourse.55 I suspect
a similar defense may be animating ongoing anti-Tatarism in Crimea. For some residents, it may
be less painful and, as Cemilev pointed out, more expedient, to valorize Stalin and disavow any
benefit from his crimes. It is far more difficult, for us all, to see events from another’s perspective.
The demonization of Crimean Tatars enables those who make allegations of depravity or treason
to elevate Stalin, fear Tatars, and avoid both guilt and shame. While some would argue against a
sociocultural use of psychoanalytic concepts, I would contend, with LaCapra, that psychoanalysis
is misunderstood as a psychology of the individual. He argues that its basic ideas actually connect
individual and society. A strict opposition is artificial—what happens to the individual is bound
up with larger social, political, and cultural processes.56
Genocide as social practice
There are a number of markers we can use to predict the future of the past in Crimea. I have already
described how the Crimean Tatars were able to publically commemorate the 1944 deportation
when Crimea was a part of Ukraine. If symbolic forms such as these help create and maintain
social hierarchies, the billboards announcing the commemorative event in 2013 were particularly
significant: the Crimean Tatars leveled, if only temporarily and incrementally, the commemorative
field when they publicized their past alongside the Russian one. Russian annexation brought a
very different reality to Crimea.
On one hand, Putin assured Crimean Tatar representatives who went to Moscow in May
2014 that Russia will take measures to protect Crimean Tatars and make them feel they are “full
fledged masters in their own land.”57 At the same time, Crimean Prime Minister Sergei Aksyonov
issued a decree that banned all mass gatherings in the region, effectively outlawing the 2014
commemoration of the deportation. Aksyonov used a kaleidoscope of shifting reasons, mostly
centered on national security, for his decision.58 The central square where Crimean Tatars would
have gathered was fenced off, guarded by ranks of Russian riot police as well as pro-Russia so
called self-defense units, and lined with armored personnel carriers. Avoiding conflict, Crimean
Tatars gathered in a field near their mosque in the Ak Mechet district, just outside the capitol
city of Simferopol. There, a foreshortened commemoration was carried out under the whirl of
helicopter blades.
This attempt to reorganize relations among the living by banning commemoration of the dead
was a way to begin the process of reordering community in post-annexation Crimea. Scholars of
genocide are increasingly recognizing how technologies of power such as these make genocide not
a discrete event with a beginning, middle, and end, but a social process.59 Clearly the change in
power, and the status of the peninsula as part of the Russian Federation, is reconfiguring more than
geopolitics. Leaders like Sergei Aksyonov, the Prime Minister and Head of the Supreme Council,
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and Natalia Poklonskaya, the chief prosecutor confirmed by President Putin, are now engaging
and intervening in the social process in which the living in Crimea must struggle with the war’s
legacy: how, when and who to honor?60 How, when, and who to mourn?
The current authorities’ aims within this emotional substrate are clear in light of the ample
space afforded to those wishing to commemorate Victory Day: shortly after the Crimean Tatars
were banned from mourning their loss, Putin flew to Crimea to publicly commemorate Soviet
victory over Nazi Germany in Sevastopol. Tens of thousands were allowed to flow into the
streets, and there was a parade with over 60 military vehicles and 70 aircraft.61 The contraction of
commemorative space accorded to Crimean Tatars relative to Russians (and Russian-Ukrainians)
throws into bold relief the very real imbalances of power on the peninsula that are papered over by
official pronouncements of equality before the law.
The Crimean Tatar response to being banned from carrying out their usual commemoration
brings us back to the link between genocide and historical memory. Genocide can be understood as
an act that is directly aimed at destroying ethno-national-religious diversity and altering the social
fabric of societies so as to remove unwanted traces of undesired peoples.62 This requires removing
people from any sites that would physically register social memory. Refat Chubarov described
the decree banning commemoration as an inhumane act, pointing out that the Crimean Tatars had
essentially been forbidden to mourn their ancestors. A popular TV talk show host, Lilia Budjorova,
asked rhetorically whether the authorities fully understood the meaning that the day of sorrow and
remembrance has for the Crimean Tatar people. She warned that the ban would be remembered
for many years, and can’t be compensated for by any amount of government spending on Crimean
Tatars.63 Budjurova’s comments suggest that if Aksyonov wants Crimean Tatar support to secure
his rule, the ban may actually be counterproductive to his aims:
Today, like tens of thousands of my compatriots, I have been banned from coming into the
center of my own town to stand next to those who have lost mothers, fathers, and children. I
have been banned from sharing their pain. You have taken away my right to make sure that
my grandchildren know that this tragedy must never repeat itself.64

Budjurova suggested that pain can only be reduced with empathy and understanding. With
this, she suggests more empathy would have set a very different tone to relations between
the new authorities and the indigenous Tatars. This also jives with what we know about
transitional justice. In the repertoire of effective mechanisms, the commemoration of victims
is widely considered a crucial part of reconciliation with a repressive past.65 In 2014, the new
Crimean administration headed by Aksyonov missed an opportunity to be more accepting of all
members of the society and move to a less polarized future. If the 2014 commemorations are any
indication, Crimeans will again be confined to a single narrative that elides the Crimean Tatar
experience.
In spite of assurances on the part of President Vladimir Putin and Aksyonov, what has
transpired since annexation hardly amounts to protection of the endangered group. For one
thing, there has been a rash of disappearances. In one case, a witness reported seeing two men
forced into a mini-van by men in black uniforms before they disappeared. Accounts vary but
according to Human Rights Watch there have been at least seven and potentially as many as 18
disappearances.66 Officials only acknowledge four. Searches of Crimean Tatar homes became
almost routine in during summer 2014. These were carried out in the name of “protecting” the
people. There has also been harassment of mass media outlets: self-defense battalions comprised
of men in camouflage gear and balaclavas have searched and seized broadcasting equipment at
some of Crimea’s major television channels. The systematic attempt to weaken the community
has included banning Crimean Tatar leaders from residing in Crimea among their people. First
came renowned defender of human rights, Ukrainian parliamentarian, and former Head of
the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, Mustafa Cemilev. Then came the elected President or Chairman of
the Mejlis, Refat Chubarov. In February 2015, acting Chairman of the Mejlis, Akhtem Chivgoz
was arrested and imprisoned. These practices amount to the gradual weakening of this people
through discrimination, harassment, and isolation, over time.
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Conclusion
As a result of this analysis, I hope to have contributed a deeper understanding of the Crimean
Tatar genocide. I have argued that while Crimea was part of Ukraine, it experienced a volatile and
yet fertile insurrection of previously subjugated knowledges. Public commemorations became a
lightening rod, channeling contestations over the recent and distant past. While previous gaps and
omissions were made visible, hegemonic power/knowledge frameworks continued to make one
group appear better than another.
These contestations are difficult to fully appreciate without a greater understanding of the
historical habitus of individuals in Crimea. Using fresh and now virtually unobtainable data, I
provide an ethnographic exploration into the thoughts and feelings of a subset of the non-Crimean
Tatar population, showing a durable disposition that informs interpretations of the past. This
perspective on the past gains its emotional valence in part from the categorical thinking, the
ontological resonance of imagining Crimean Tatars as a threat. Based on the interview data, it
seems Crimea lacks the cognitive and affective foundation to formulate an inclusive and civil
society. Here, the lack of both guilt and shame with respect to the 1944 deportation are significant.
If we place the Crimean Tatar experience in the framework of critical genocide studies, we
see the struggle over the past in Crimea as a technology of power that has an ongoing capacity
to restructure relations among the living. I have exposed part of the process through which the
aftermath of genocide has become attenuated. More ethnography can clarify if we are witnessing the
aftermath of genocide or its prelude. The desecration of graves, the graffiti on historic monuments,
hateful discussions on Facebook and other social media, searches of homes, mosques and schools,
and the exile and imprisonment of Crimean Tatar leaders beg that question.
The question of what will become of public memory in post-Ukrainian Crimea is an urgent
one: will Crimea be obligated to exclusively valorize the Soviet past, or will it “unhide” the human
and social costs associated with past victories? In the aftermath of genocide, the contents of
Crimean Tatar memory and history continue to be eclipsed, and neostalinism thrives. Any attempt
by the new authorities to see only one side of the historic coin will result in a flat and ultimately
unsatisfying account of the past.
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